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Net Gift Gives Rise to Taxable Income to Donor: Diedrich v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue.'—Subject to a yearly exclusion 2 and a lifetime credit, 3 the
Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax upon noncharitable transfers of property
by gift, 4 except those between spouses.' The donor is primarily liable for pay-
ment of the gift tax attendant upon such a transfer.' In a typical taxable gift
situation the donor will satisfy this obligation out of other, non-gifted assets,
thus increasing the cost to him of effecting the transfer, possibly by as much as
60% of the amount of the transfer.' In some instances, as a way of reducing the
cost to the donor of such giving, the gift transfer has been structured so as to be
explicitly conditional upon the donee's assumption of the donor's gift tax
liability.' When the transaction is structured in this manner, the value of the
taxable gift for gift tax purposes is not, as it would normally be, simply equal to
the fair market value of the entire property transferred.' Rather, it is computed
by subtracting from this fair market value the amount of gift tax paid by the
donee.'" The taxable portion of the transfer is, therefore, determined by
reference to the gift tax to be paid by the donee. Because the amount of this tax
cannot be computed until the amount of the taxable gift has first been deter-
mined, it is necessary to perform an involved computation to arrive at the cor-
rect amounts." It is because the donee only receives a net benefit, equal to the
value of the property transferred to him diminished by the amount of gift tax
that he must pay, that the transaction is commonly termed a "net gift."
There is no longer any debate that the preceding properly describes the
gift tax consequences of structuring a donative transfer as a net gift.' 2 There
has been disagreement, however, concerning what if any should be the income
tax consequences of a net gift." The Internal Revenue Service has maintained
' 457 U.S. 191 (1982).
I.R.C. 5 2503 (b) (Supp. V 1981).
3 I.R.C. 5 2505 (a), (b) (Supp. V 1981).
* I.R.C. 5 2501 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). This is subject to some further qualifications,
none of which are relevant for purposes of this article. See, e.g., I.R.C. 5 2501 (a)(3) (Supp. V
1981).
I.R.C. 5 2523 (a) (Supp. V 1981).
I.R.C. 5 2502 (c) (Supp. V 1981). In the event such taxes are not paid when due, the
donee is personally liable for the payment of gift taxes to the extent of the value of the gift. I.R.C.
5 6324 (b) (Supp. V 1981).
I.R.C. 55 2001 (c), 2502 (a) (Supp. V 1981). Sixty percent represents the maximum
marginal rate of gift tax as of January 1, 1983. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 provided
for a phased-in reduction in this percentage, from the then current rate of 70%, to 50% for gifts
made on or after January 1, 1985. I.R.C. 2001(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
13
 The technique described can result in other advantages to the donor. See infra notes
188-93 and accompanying text.
9 Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310, 311-13.
t° Id,
l/
' 2 Id. See Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350, 1356-57 (1952). See supra notes 9-11
and accompanying text.
" Compare Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752
(6th Cir. 1969), nonacq., 1971-2 C.B. 4 (no income tax consequences) with Johnson v. Commissioner,
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that such a transaction constitutes an income realization event to the donor,
arguing that the gift tax to be paid by the donee constitutes consideration for
the transfer." The Service has in this manner attempted to characterize the
transaction as being in part a sale, and only in part a gift. 15 The Service's posi-
tion has been that the donor ought to realize gain on the transaction to the ex-
tent that the "consideration" received exceeds the donor's basis in the proper-
ty transferred." In an opinion affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the Tax Court rejected this contention." The court focused instead upon the
donor's intent to make a net gift, that is, a gift equal to the value of the trans-
ferred property diminished by the gift tax payable by the donee."' The court
reasoned that since the donor had no intention of making a sale to the donee,
the transaction could not properly be characterized as such for income tax pur-
poses. 19
 Later decisions of the Tax Court consistently adhered to this rationale
in net gift situations, repeatedly rejecting similar attempts by the Service to
characterize the net gift transaction as including a "sale" element."
Recently, however, the Supreme Court considered and rejected the Tax
Court's position that a net gift transaction is not an income taxable event. In
59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974) (in-
come tax liability incurred by donor).
" McNeice v, Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 969, 970 (1981); Evangelista v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1057, 1061-62 (1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 1218, 1221 (7th Cir. 1980); Estate
of Weeden v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 699, 700 (1979), rev'd, 685 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.
1982); Benson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 989, 990 (1978); Bradford v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C. 584, 590 (1978); Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665,,669 (1978);
Estate of Owen v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CC H) 272, 273 (1978); Estate of Levine, 72 T.C.
780, 788 (1979), aff'd 634 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1980); Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 310-
12 (1974), aff'd en bane, 572 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.
791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079, 1091 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1976); Estate of
Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363, 1366.67 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694
(5th Cir. 1972); Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242, 1248 (1971).
" See cases cited supra note 14.
16 See Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 362 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752
(6th Cir. 1969) (transfer by donor of appreciated securities on condition that donees pay resulting
gift tax liability).
" Id. at 364.
" Id. at 363.
" Id.
2°
 McNeice v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 969, 970 (1981); Estate of Weeden v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 699, 700 (1979), rev'd, 685 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1982); Benson
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 989, 991 (1978); Bradford v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584,
594 (1978); Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665, 674-75 (1978); Estate of Owen v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 272, 273 (1978); Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 313
(1974), aff'd en banc, 572 F.2d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 1978); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 1363, 1366-67 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972); Krause v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242, 1248 (1971). There have been cases contra, but all present facts
distinguishable from those in a pure net gift situation. See Evangelista v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
1057, 1067 (1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 1218, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980); Estate of Levine, 72 T.C. 780, 788
(1979), aff'd, 634 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973),
aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
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Diedrich v. Commissioner, 21 the Court held, in an eight-to-one decision, 22 that a
donor who makes a gift of property on the condition that the donee pay the
resulting gift taxes realizes taxable income to the extent that the gift taxes paid
by the donee exceed the donor's adjusted basis in the property. 23 The Diedrich
decision is significant in that it resolves the split in the circuits created by the
lower court's decision in the same case. 24 In addition, the Court's decision vin-
dicates a position that the Commissioner had long advocated in the face of
strong resistance from the courts. 25
This casenote will first frame the legal background against which Diedrich
was decided. 26 Next, the casenote will analyze the Supreme Court's reasoning
in the Diedrich opinion, approving the Court's holding that a net gift transac-
tion is an income realization event. 27 The casenote will then address the follow-
ing issues which are raised by the Diedrich opinion. First, assuming gain is to be
realized on the transaction, the casenote will consider the proper year for its
recognition." Specifically, this section will discuss whether recognition should
be required in the year in which the donee assumes the obligation (the year of
the gift), or the year in which the donee discharges the obligation (the year the
gift tax is paid). Second, the casenote will consider whether, for purposes of
computing the amount of the donor's gain, the donor's basis in the entire prop-
erty should be set off against the amount realized, or only that portion of the
donor's basis which is attributable to the "sale" portion of the transfer." The
Court in Diedrich chose the former alternative, but did not justify this conclu-
sion. Third, the method the donee should use to compute his basis in the gifted
property, and whether his holding period includes that of the donor, will be ad-
dressed." The casenote will propose a resolution to each of these issues, and in
doing so, will submit a method for dealing with net gift transactions which
more accurately reflects the economic realities of the transaction.
" 457 U.S. 191 (1982).
22 Id. at 200. Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent. Id.
23 Id. at 199-200.
24 Compare Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981) (income tax liabili-
ty incurred by donor) with Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (no income tax
consequences).
25 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Taxpayer ire at the Commissioner's per-
sistence on this issue perhaps reached its zenith in McNeice v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M.
(CCH) 696 (1981), when the petitioner requested the Court to award punitive damages against
the Commissioner for continuing to litigate the issue in light of the adverse judicial precedents.
Id. at 970 n.4.
26 See infra notes 31-83 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 84-126 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 127-176 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 177-195 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 196-239 and accompanying text.
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I. THE BACKGROUND OF DIEDRICH
Prior to Diedrich, the decisions generally took one of two positions on the
net gift question. 3 ' These contrary positions are best exemplified by the two
seminal cases of Turner v. Commissioner" and Johnson v. Commissioner."
In Turner, the taxpayer made a number of transfers of appreciated stock to
individuals and trusts." These transfers were conditioned upon the trans-
ferees' agreeing to pay the donor's gift tax arising from the transfer." The
Commissioner characterized each transaction as a "part sale and part gift," 36
and hence argued that the donor ought to recognize taxable income to the ex-
tent that the consideration received by her for the transfer exceeded her ad-
justed basis in the property." Rejecting this contention, the Tax Court stated
that the substance rather than the form of the transaction ought to be decisive,
and that the substance should properly be determined from an examination of
the donor's intent in entering into the transaction." Based on its conclusion
that the evident intention of the taxpayer was to make a gift equal to the value
of the shares transferred less the value of the gift tax payable on the transfers,
the court held that the transfers by the donor were simply gifts and did not
result in taxable gain to her."
The position taken by the Tax Court and approved by the Sixth Circuit in
Turner, that the intent of the donor determined whether or not he had taxable
gain on the transaction, was later followed in decisions by the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits." As a result, until the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Diedrich, the
" The legal background of the Diedrich decision has been reviewed extensively in the
legal literature. See, e.g., Note, Federal Income Tax — Net Cift Doctrine, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 1074
(1978); Note, Donee Payment of Cift Tax: Crane, Old Colony Trust, and the Need of Congressional Action,
80 Mich. L. Rev. 1128 (1982); Note, Gifts — The Income Tax Treatment of Net Gifts, 57 Notre
Dame Law. 420 (1981); Comment, Federal Income Tax — Income Taxation of Net Gifts After Hirst v.
Commissioner, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 389 (1979); Comment, The Tax Consequences of Net Gifts, 48
Tenn. L.R. 404 (1981); Comment, A Uniform Theoryfor Determining Whether a Donor has Taxable In-
come on a Net Gift, 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 95 (1981).
32 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
" 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040
(1974).
34
 49 T.C. at 358.
35 Id
36 Id. at 357. In fact, the Commissioner only made this argument with respect to the
transfers to individuals. Id. The Commissioner conceded, for reasons which are not entirely
clear, "that the transfers to the trusts were in no part sales." Id.
° Id. A part sale, part gift transaction is one in which the seller transfers property to the
buyer/donee for a consideration which is less than the fair market value of the property. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (e)(1) (1960). In such a case, the seller has a gain to the extent that the
amount realized by him exceeds his adjusted basis in the property. Treas. Reg. 1.1001.1 (e)(1)
(1960).
" 49 T.C. at 363.
" Id. at 364.
40 See Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974), aff'd en bane, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.
1978); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Tax Court, for stare decisis reasons, consistently adhered to the Turner rationale
in net gift situations."
In 1974, the Turner rationale for finding no income in a net gift situation
was apparently undercut when the Sixth Circuit, which, had written the Turner
decision, decided Johnson o. Commissioner. 42 Johnson presented a fact situation
quite different from that of Turner. InJohnson, the taxpayer borrowed $200,000
from a bank by signing a nonrecourse note secured by 50,000 shares of stock
which were worth approximately $500,000, and which had a basis in his hands
of $10,813. 43
 He then transferred the stock to an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of his children, with the trustees assuming the $200,000 liability.** The
taxpayer paid the resulting $150,000 gift tax liability out of the proceeds of the
loan, leaving him with $50,000 in cash and no obligation on the note." In the
Tax Court, the Commissioner took the position that the transfers were part
sales and part gifts, and that the taxpayer realized a taxable gain on the trans-
action to the extent that the loan proceeds exceeded his basis in the stock." The
taxpayer, relying on Turner, argued that the transactions were simply gifts in
the $300,000 net amount, and should not have any income tax consequences."
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, holding that "[t]o the extent
the transfers were subject to the loans they were sales and [the petitioner] .
realized capital gains in the amount his loan exceeded his basis in the stock. "48
In affirming the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the taxpayer
realized income on the transaction to the extent that the loan proceeds ex-
ceeded his basis in the stock transferred." In the circuit court's view, however,
it was immaterial whether or not the substance of the transaction was described
as a "part sale and part gift."" Characterizing this language as "suggestive
but artificial,"" the circuit court instead focused, as the Turner court had pur-
ported to do, on the economic substance of the transaction. 52 The circuit court
concluded that the $200,000 loan proceeds received by the taxpayer ought to
constitute gross income under section 61 of the Code. 53
 The taxpayer, the court
4' See supra note 20 and accompanying text, In Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307
(1974), the Tax Court acknowledged that there was some force to the Commissioner's claim that
the transaction contained an exchange element. Id. at 315. Nonetheless, the court considered
itself bound by the factually similar Turner precedent, and accordingly held that the donor
recognized no gain on the transaction. Id.
45
 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974),
43 Id. at 1080. There were actually three taxpayers, all of whom entered into substan-
tially identical transactions. Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791, 807 (1973).
47 Id. at 812.
45 Id.
45
 495 F,2d at 1086.
" Id. at 1084.
5 ' Id.
" Id. at 1082-83.
53 Id. I.R.C. S 61(a) (1976) reads in pertinent part as follows: "[e]xcept as otherwise
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noted, had received these proceeds free of any obligation to repay them out of
property in his possession." Although the Court of Appeals in Johnson implied
that in substance the transaction could be viewed as analogous to the one in
Turner, 55 it held that the conclusion that the taxpayer realized gain on the trans-
action would be proper in any event. 56 The taxpayer in Johnson had argued that
with respect to the $150,000 used by the donor to pay gift tax, the transaction
was equivalent to the one in Turner." Because the donee had assumed liability
for repayment of a loan, the proceeds of which were used to pay the donor's gift
tax, the taxpayer argued that as an economic matter the donee had paid the
donor's tax." The court held, without explicitly overruling Turner, that even if
the transaction were viewed in this way, the donor in Johnson would still realize
income, 59 under the principles of either Crane v. Commissioner, 6° or Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner. 6 '
In Crane, the taxpayer inherited from her husband an apartment building
worth approximately $250,000, subject to a nonrecourse mortgage in the same
amount. 62
 Seven years later, after taking approximately $25,000 in deprecia-
tion deductions, the taxpayer sold the property for the buyer's assumption of
the mortgage, and for an additional consideration of $2,500. 63 She reported
$2,500 of gain on the sale, claiming that all she had inherited from her husband
was his equity in the building, which was zero, and hence that her gain should
be the excess of the amount realized on the sale over the amount of that equity,
that is, $2,500. 64 The Commissioner's position was that the taxpayer realized
approximately $27,500 of gain on the sale. 65 Her basis in the building, he con-
tended, was roughly the $250,000 it was worth when she inherited it, reduced
by approximately $25,000 of depreciation allowable in the intervening seven
years. 66 The amount she realized on the sale, he claimed, was $252,500, which
amount was the sum of (1) the $2,500 of cash she received on the sale, and (2)
the $250,000 nonrecourse mortgage to which the property was subject when
the buyer purchased it." The Supreme Court in Crane sustained the Commis-
provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including
(but not limited to) ... (12) Income from discharge of indebtedness; 	 " Id,
" 495 F.2d 1083.
" Id.
56 Id.
" Id. at 1081.
56
 Id.
59 Id. at 1083.
60 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
61 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
62
 331 U.S. at 3. The amounts in the following discussion are rounded off for simplic-
ity.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 4. Note that the taxpayer's claim that her basis in the building was zero is in-
consistent with her reporting position that she was entitled to depreciation deductions computed
on a basis of $250,000.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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sioner's position, and held that the "amount realized" upon the sale of proper-
ty includes the amount of nonrecourse liabilities assumed by the buyer."
Drawing on Crane, the Johnson court reasoned that since the taxpayer had re-
tained the $200,000 cash proceeds of the loan, while transferring away the
property which secured the offsetting nonrecourse obligation, the taxpayer
realized income in the amount of the debt disposed of."
In support of its holding that the taxpayer realized income to the extent
that the loan proceeds exceeded his basis in the stock transferred, the Johnson
court also relied on Old Colony Trust." In Old Colony Trust, the taxpayer was a
corporate executive whose employer, pursuant to a resolution adopted by the
Board of Directors, had agreed to pay all state and federal income taxes which
thereafter became due and payable in respect of the salaries of all the officers of
the company." The Supreme Court, sustaining the Commissioner's deter-
mination, held that such payments were includible in the gross income of the
taxpayer in the year in which they were made." The Court stated that: "[fit is
therefore immaterial that the taxes were directly paid over to the government.
The discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt
by the person taxed.""
In Johnson, the court reasoned that since the payment of gift taxes is the
donor's obligation, the donee's assumption of liability on the bank loan, the
proceeds of which were used to satisfy the donor's gift tax obligation, was con-
structively equivalent to a direct payment by the donee of the donor's gift tax
obligation. 74 The court held, therefore, that the portion of the loan proceeds
used to pay the donor's gift tax liability constituted income to the donor under
Old Colony Trust."
Although it appears from the foregoing that the Johnson court rejected
outright the rule of Turner, the court did not purport to do this, being satisfied
simply to confine Turner to its "peculiar fact situation." 76 As a result of this
failure by the Johnson court to overrule Turner explicitly, Johnson was considered
the rule where previously encumbered property was gratuitously transferred, 77
but the Turner rationale was still held controlling in net gift situations."
68 Id. at 13.
69 495 F.2d at 1083. Prior to Johnson, the Crane case had already been applied in the gift
area in First National Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 1182, 1186 (fith Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969), where the donor was charged with capital gain upon the gift of
property mortgaged in excess of its basis. Id.
70
 495 F.2d at 1083.
" Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 719-20.
72 Id. at 729.
" Id.
" Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1083.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1086.
77 See Estate of Levine, 72 T.C. 780, 791 (1979), aff'd, 634 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1980);
Evangelista v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1057, 1064 (1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 1218, 1224, n.15 (7th
Cir. 1980).
7" See e.g., McNeice v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 969, 970 (1981); Benson v.
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Thus, the Diedrich case was decided against divergent lines of precedent,
each of which adopted a fundamentally different approach to the net gift trans-
action. Although both purported to analyze the economic substance of the
transaction, the cases decided under Turner focused on the donor's intent to
make a net gift in determining the economic substance of the transaction,
allowing this factor to control the income tax treatment of the transaction. 79
These cases consistently held that the donor's intent to make a gift net of gift
tax precluded the characterization of the transaction as in part a sale, and
hence held that the donor realized no gain on the transaction." Johnson and fac-
tually similar cases, on the other hand, examined the transaction from the
point of view of the actual economic benefit realized by the donor." These
cases found income tax liability in connection with transactions which, while
not involving net gifts in the pure sense, were nevertheless economically
equivalent to net gifts. 82 Relying on Crane and Old Colony Trust, these cases held
that the taxpayer realizes income by shedding a liability he would otherwise
have been obligated to repay." In the next section, the casenote will examine
the Diedrich decision, focusing on the way in which the Supreme Court applied
the theoretical basis of Johnson to facts analogous to those in Turner.
II. DIEDRICH V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
In Diedrich," the taxpayer and his wife each made gifts totalling approx-
imately 85,000 shares of stock to or for the benefit of their three adult
children." At the time the gifts were made, the donees executed agreements
providing that as a condition of receiving the gifts they would each pay a pro-
portionate share of the gift tax for which the taxpayer was liable as a result of
the transfer. 86 They subsequently paid this liability, in the amount of
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 989, 991 (1978); Bradford v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584,
594 (1978); Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665, 671 (1978); Estate of Owen v. Com-
missioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 272, 273 (1978); Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 313 (1974),
aff'd en bans, 572 F.2d 427, 428 (4th Cir. 1978); Estate of Weeden v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M.
(CCH) 699, 700 (1979), rev 'd, 685 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner,
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363, 1368 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694, 694 (5th Cir. 1972).
" See Turner, 49 T.C. at 363; Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427, 430 (4th Cir.
1978). In a number of cases, the Tax Court has relied more on stare decisis than on any explicit ex-
amination of donor intent in adhering to the Turner rule. See McNeice v. Commissioner, 41
T.C.M. (CCH) 969, 970 (1981); Bradford v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584, 594 (1978); Estate of
Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665, 675 (1978); Estate of Owen v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 272, 273 (1978); Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242, 1248 (1971).
8° See cases cited supra note 79.
" See Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1980); Evangelista v.
Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1218, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079,
1082-84 (6th Cir, 1979).
82 See supra note 81.
88 See cases cited supra note 81.
84 457 U.S. 191 (1982). Diedrich was consolidated on appeal with Estate of Grant v.
Commissioner. Id. at 194. Since there are no material distinctions between the two cases, id. at
192-94, only the facts of Diedrich will he set forth herein.
85 Id
86 Id.
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$62,992. 8 ' The taxpayers' basis in the stock was 151,073. 88 On their 1972
federal income tax return, the taxpayers did not report as income any part of
the gift tax paid on their behalf by the donees. 89 On audit, the Commissioner
determined that the taxpayers had realized gain in the amount by which their
gift tax liabilities, discharged by the donees, exceeded their basis in the
transferred stoek. 9° The taxpayers thereafter sought a redetermination in the
Tax Court of the asserted deficiencies. 9 ' Adhering to its prior line of decisions
beginning with Turner, the Tax Court upheld the taxpayers' position that they
had merely made a net gift of the difference between the fair market value of
the transferred property and the gift tax paid by the donees. 92
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxpayers
recognized taxable gain on the transaction to the extent that the gift tax paid on
their behalf by the donees exceeded their basis in the stock transferred." The
circuit court acknowledged that the facts in Diedrich were indistinguishable
from those in Turner," but went on to accept the Commissioner's contention
that Turner and its progeny had been wrongly decided." In the court's view,
the approach taken by the Johnson court, 96 in the case of an asset gratuitously
transferred subject to a pre-existing encumbrance, was also the correct one to
take in a net gift situation. 97 The taxpayer argued that Johnson could be
distinguished because in that case, the transfer was subject to a pre-existing en-
cumbrance which had arisen as a result of the taxpayer's previous borrowing
against the appreciation of the property." Rejecting this argument, the court
observed that in the case before it, as in all net gift situations, the liability shed
only arose upon the transfer itself. 99 The court held that the difference between
a previously existing encumbrance, and one which only arises as a result of the
transfer itself, was not sufficient to distinguish the two situations.'" In either
87 Id.
88 id.
8" Id.
9° Id. at 193. Accordingly, the Commissioner determined a deficiency in the taxpayers'
taxable income for 1972 of $5,959, computed as follows:
Gift tax paid in 1972 $62,992
Less: Basis in stock transferred (51,073)
Long-term capital gain 11,919
Less: I.R.C. § 1202 deduction (5,959)
Increase in taxable income 5,959
Id.	 n.l.
Id. at 193.
92 Diedrich v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CC H) 433, 433-35 (1979).
93 Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499, 504 (8th Cir. 1981).
94 Id. at 501.
95 Id. at 502.
96 Id. (citing Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974)). See supra notes
42-61 and accompanying text.
" 643 F.2d at 502.
98 Id. at 503.
99 Id.
100
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case, the appeals court held, the determinative factor is receipt of the benefit.'°'
It does not matter whether the benefit takes the form of relief from an encum-
brance or relief from a tax liability; 102 in either case the taxpayer has construc-
tively received income on the transaction.'" Although the court did not ex-
pressly so state, its reliance upon and description of Johnson make it apparent
that the arguments therein based upon Crane and Old Colony Trust formed the
rationale for its decision.'"
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit, finding tax-
able income to the donor in a net gift situatiim. 1 °5 In the majority decision writ-
ten by Chief Justice Burger,'" the Court rejected the theory that the donor's
intent was a factor in determining whether or not the transaction gave rise to
taxable income. 107 Instead, the Court adopted the economic benefit ar-
guments, based upon Crane and Old Colony Trust, which had formed the ra-
tionale for Johnson. 108
 The Court reasoned as follows. When a gift is made, the
donor incurs a debt to the United States in the amount of the gift tax due in
respect of the transaction.'" The donee's agreement to discharge the donor's
indebtedness in consideration of the gift, therefore, gives rise to an economic
benefit to the donor."° It does not matter whether the benefit to the donor
arises from the assumption by the donee of a previously existing encumbrance
upon the transferred property, or from his assumption of the gift tax arising
from the transfer; the benefit to the donor is the same in either case."' The
Court stated that:
Consistent with the economic reality, the Commissioner has treated these
conditional gifts as a discharge of indebtedness through a part gift and part
sale of the gift property transferred. The transfer is treated as if the .0onor
sells the property to the donee for less than the fair market value. The "sale"
price is the amount necessary to discharge the gift tax indebtedness; the
balance of the value of the transferred property is treated as a gift. 12
Thus the Court apparently agreed with the Commissioner that an analysis
of the economic realities of the net gift transaction demonstrates that both
"gift" and "sale" elements are involved." 3
 The Court, however, did not pur-
'°' Id. at 503-04.
in Id. at 504.
103 Id.
104 See supra notes 62 -83 and accompanying text.
1 °5
 457 U.S. at 192.
1°6 Id. Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent. Id. at 200.
107 Id. at 197
-98.
'°' Id. See supra notes 62 & 75 and accompanying text. The court interpreted both Crane
and Old Colony Trust as standing for the general proposition that income may be realized by in-
direct means, and that a taxpayer must recognize income whenever he realized an economic
benefit through the discharge of an obligation. Id. at 195-96..
109 Id. at 197.
"°
"' Id. at 198.
" 2 Id. at 198-99.
119 Id.
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port to engage in any such economic analysis, nor did it explicitly adopt the
Commissioner's "part sale and part gift" characterization as being an accurate
reflection of the transaction's underlying economic realities.
In finding taxable income in a net gift situation and overruling the Turner
line of cases, the Supreme Court in Diedrich reached the correct result as a mat-
ter of income definition. The Turner court had examined the transaction and
found that the intention of the taxpayer was simply to make a net gift, equal in
value to the total amount of the transfer reduced by the amount of the gift tax
payable in connection therewith." 4 Based upon this finding, the Turner court
had held that the transfers by the donor were simply net gifts and therefore did
not result in taxable income to her. The flaw in this approach is that it confuses
a gift tax analysis of the transaction with an income tax analysis. The Turner
court apparently neglected to consider that the income and gift tax systems are
conceptually and practically distinct, and that a given transaction can have im-
plications in the former wholly apart from any it may have in the latter. Thus it
is perfectly correct to state that the conditional nature of the transfer reduces
the effective amount thereof, and that therefore the transaction can properly be
viewed as simply a gift in the net amount. It is erroneous, however, to con-
clude that the transfer has no income tax consequences. The gift tax and in-
come tax consequences of a transaction must in all cases be approached
separately. In the net gift situation, the proper approach is to disregard the gift
tax aspects of the transaction when analyzing whether or not it has income tax
consequences.
When the net gift transaction is viewed in this manner, it is apparent that
two significant occurrences have taken place. First, the donor has engaged in a
transfer which has given rise to a liability equal in amount to the gift tax which
becomes payable as a result of the transfer. The effect of the transfer is thus to
reduce the donor's net worth by this same amount."' Second, the donee has
furnished consideration for the transfer by assuming the donor's liability for
payment of this tax obligation. Consequently, the donor's net worth has been
increased by the amount of the liability assumed by the donee. Such an in-
crease is an "accession to wealth, clearly realized,' "" which, under the broad
net worth test of income set forth by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glen-
shaw Glass Co. , 117 is properly includible in gross income. The situation can be
viewed as analogous to one in which an asset is transferred subject to an ex-
isting liability. The transferor in such a situation realizes an increase in net
worth in the amount of the liability of which he is relieved, and this increase is
properly includible in his gross income." 8
" 4 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
"' For purposes of income tax analysis, the reduction in net worth brought about by the
making of the gift must be ignored, since personal gifts are not deductible for income tax pur-
poses.
" 6 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
" 7 Id. at 430-32.
" 8 See the discussion of Crane, supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
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Despite the fact that the Diedrich holding is correct as a matter of income
definition, there are a number of problems with the decision resulting from the
Court's failure to analyze the net gift transaction from an economic standpoint.
The Court substituted for an economic analysis of the transaction the bald
statement that "Nile principles of Old Colony and Crane control. " "9 This im-
plies nothing meaningful about the economic substance of the transaction.
Crane and Old Colony merely stand for rules of law, the implications of which are
wholly dependent upon the particular facts and economic substance of the
transaction to which they are applied. Thus, in Old Colony Trust, the taxpayer's
employer paid his income taxes for him pursuant to a resolution by the com-
pany.'" The Supreme Court there held that the taxpayer realized taxable in-
come as a result of the payment, stating that "[t]he discharge by a third person
of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed. "121 On the
facts of Diedrich, therefore, the rule of Old Colony Trust establishes that the
donee's payment of the tax debt which is the donor's obligation would be
equivalent to receipt by the donor of that amount. It does not, however, answer
the question of whether or how much of that receipt constitutes taxable
income.'" To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze the economic
substance of the transaction.
Similarly, the rule of Crane, that the seller of an asset subject to non-
recourse indebtedness must include in the amount received on such sale the
amount of such indebtedness assumed by the buyer,'" assuming it is ap-
plicable to the facts of Diedrich, does not establish whether the amount deemed
received constitutes taxable income. Again, it is the economic substance of the
transaction which controls on this issue. To argue, as does the Court, that
simply because "the principles of Old Colony and Crane control" 124 the donor
perforce has taxable income on the transaction, is to omit a crucial step in the
analysis, that is, an examination of the true economic substance of the transac-
tion. This omission in turn leaves open a number of issues after Diedrich which
in all probability would have been resolved by implication had the Court
engaged in such an economic analysis.
The casenote will now turn to an examination of these issues. First, the
question of which year is the proper one for the recognition of the gain will be ad-
dressed.'" Next, the propriety of the Court's apparent holding that the donor
may offset against his gain his basis in the entire transferred property will be ex-
"9
 457 U.S. at 196.
' 20 Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 720.
121
 Id. at 729.
122 Many receipts of money or property, such as gifts, which are accretions to wealth,
are not included in gross income. See, e.g.,
	 S 102(a) (1976).
123 See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
124
 457 U.S. at 196.
129
 The Court did not consider whether the gain ought properly to be recognized in the
year the gift is made, or in the year the gift tax is actually paid by the donee. See id. at 191. Both
the Commissioner and the taxpayer conceded this issue. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d
499, 500, n.2 (8th Cir. 1981).
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amined.' 26 The casenote will then view the problem from the donee's perspec-
tive, considering what his basis and holding period would be in the event that
he should contemplate a subsequent resale of the gifted asset. The resolution of
this issue will hinge on whether or not "part sale and part gift" can properly be
adopted as the definitive substantive characterization of the net gift transac-
tion. In the context of proposing resolutions to these issues, the casenote will
analyze the economic substance of the net gift situation. Such an analysis will
illuminate both the problems surrounding the net gift transaction and the
resolutions proposed.
III. WHEN SHOULD THE DONOR RECOGNIZE GAIN?
The Supreme Court's holding in Diedrich, that the donor in a net gift situa-
tion realizes gain to the extent that the gift tax paid by the donee exceeds the
donor's basis in the property transferred, raises the issue of when the gain is to
be recognized, in the year the donor makes the gift or in the year the donee
pays the tax.'"
The Court cited both Crane and Old Colony Trust in support of its holding in
Diedrich that the donor in a net gift situation realizes taxable income on the
transaction.'" The Court's citation of both cases, however, creates an am-
biguity concerning the implications of the decision with respect to the resolu-
tion of this timing question. If the rule of Crane is controlling, then the gain is
realized, and hence ought to be recognized,'" in the year in which the gift is
made. In Crane, the Court held that the seller realized the benefit when she
transferred the property subject to the mortgage debt, since in effect this
removed her personal liability.'" Two recent cases in the Second and Seventh
Circuits followed Crane in adopting this view.' 3 ' The regulations under Internal
Revenue Code section 1001, which concern the computation of gain or loss on
'" 457 U.S. at 199-200. The court seemed to allow this offset. Id. It adduced no support
for the proposition, however. See id.
127 Barring anomalous situations such as a low income year or the availability of car-
ryovers which are about to expire, it will usually be to the donor's advantage for the gain not to
be recognized until the year of payment, because of the benefit of deferral. In any event, from the
point of view of the practitioner, planning considerations make it crucial that this question be
answered.
128 457 U.S. at 196.
129
 I.R.C. § 1001(e) (1976) provides: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle,
the entire amount of the gain or loss „ . on the sale or exchange of property shall be recognized."
Id.
13° Crane, 331 U.S. at 14. The Court stated, "if he transfers subject to the mortgage, the
benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal
debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another." Id.
' 3 ' Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1980) (assumption of
mortgage debt by trust was equivalent of constructive receipt of cash by decedent; taxpayer
realized gain upon the transfer of the encumbered property); Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629
F.2d 1218, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980) (donor recognized gain upon the transfer of encumbered proper-
ty to trust).
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the sale or other disposition of property, are to substantially the same effect.' 32
The theory underlying both the regulations and the cases appears to be that if
the taxable event is taken to be a "sale or other disposition,' ' 1 " as opposed to a
discharge of indebtedness, then the gain ought properly to be recognized in the
year of the disposition. 134
 There is language in the Diedrich decision which ap-
pears to support the interpretation that it is this disposition which gives rise to
the tax liability.'" The Court emphasized the fact that the donor realizes an
immediate economic benefit upon the donee's assumption of the donor's gift
tax liability.'" This emphasis, when considered in the light of the Court's ap-
parent reliance on the reasoning of Crane, strongly supports the conclusion that
the gain ought to be recognized in the year of the transfer.' 37
If, on the other hand, the rationale of Old Colony Trust is found to be con-
trolling on this issue, it would be more logical to conclude that the gain is not
taxable until the year in which the donee actually discharges the liability. In
Old Colony Trust, the taxpayer realized income upon the actual payment of his
tax liability by his employer, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement to
make this payment had been made in a prior year. 138
 Thus, the receipt of the
economic benefit under Old Colony Trust is thought not to occur until the actual
discharge of the taxpayer's obligation by another.'" In a net gift situation, this
132 Treas. Reg. 5 1.1001-2 (1980) reads in part as follows:
(a) Inclusion in amount realized —
(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) and (3) of this section, the
amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property includes the amount of
liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the sale or disposi-
tion....
(4) Special rules. For purposes of this section ...
(ii) The sale or other disposition of property that secures a recourse liability
discharges the transferor from the liability if another person agrees to pay the liabili-
ty (whether or not the transferor is in fact released from liability);
(iii) A disposition of property includes a gift of the property or a transfer of the
property in satisfaction of liabilities to which it is subject; ...
Id.
133 I.R.C. 5 1001(a) (1976).
134
 In a net gift transaction, this would be the year in which the gift was made.
'" 457 U.S. at 191. The Court stated: "when a donee agrees to discharge an in-
debtedness in consideration of the gift, the person relieved of the tax liability realizes an economic
benefit. In short, the donor realizes an immediate economic benefit by the donee's assumption of the
donor's legal obligation to pay the gift tax." Id. (emphasis supplied).
136 Id.
131
 Considerations of tax equity also favor this conclusion. As the Supreme Court
recognized, it does not make sense to treat the donor who realizes a benefit from the pre-gift sale
of assets differently from the donor who realized the equivalent benefit by making a net gift. 457
U.S. at 198.
158 Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 720, 729.
139 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. In a later case, the Court described its
holding in Old Colony Trust as follows:
We have held that income was received by a taxpayer, when, pursuant to a contract,
a debt or other obligation was discharged by another for his benefit. The transaction
was regarded as being the same in substance as if the money had been paid to the
taxpayer and he had transmitted it to his creditor.
Douglas v. Wilcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935).
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discharge does not take place until the donee actually pays the gift tax. Pay-
ment occurs typically in the succeeding year, since gift taxes in respect of gifts
made during the calendar year are not due and payable until April 15 of the en-
suing year.'" Until this payment occurs, the donor remains by statute per-
sonally liable for payment of the gift tax,' 4 ' and the donee's unsecured promise
to pay possibly remains too speculative a benefit to constitute income.'"
This result, that the donor realizes no income until the donee actually pays
the tax, was recently reached on analogous facts by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Estate of Weeden o. Commissioner.'" The taxpayer in Weeden
transferred shares of stock in his brokerage business to his four nephews, upon
the written condition that they pay the resulting gift taxes.'" This stock
transfer was substantially the same transaction as had been entered into by the
taxpayer in Diedrich. Following the Supreme Court's holding in Diedrich, the
circuit court found that the taxpayer had realized taxable income as a result of
the transaction. 145 The Commissioner had further argued that the gain was
properly taxable in the year in which the gift taxes were paid, while the tax-
payer argued that the year of transfer was proper.'"
The court upheld the Commissioner, holding that the gain was taxable in
the year of payment of the gift tax.'" The court employed a two part rationale
to reach this conclusion.'" First, the court said, a cash basis taxpayer must
report income received in the form of property only if the property has an
ascertainable market value,'" and hence is the equivalent of cash. The court
found that because the benefit of the donees' promises to pay ran only to the
taxpayer, they had no ascertainable market value.'" Second, since the tax-
payer remained by statute liable for payment until the donees actually paid the
gift tax, the benefit and consequently the income did not accrue until that pay-
ment was made.' 5 '
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there are reasonably strong
arguments in favor of both the Crane and Old Colony Trust positions. The better
approach, however, and one which is more in harmony with both the rationale
140 See I.R.C.	 6075(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
14 ' See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
"2 See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1931).
1 " 685 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1982).
144 Id.
14 ' Id. at 1161.
16 Id. Note the reversal of positions from those which it would be more typical for the
parties to adopt.
1 " Id.
Ha Id. The court characterized its decision as being "based on several policy considera-
tions." Id.
"a Id. This argument is based upon I.R.C. 5 1001(b) (1976), which reads in pertinent
part as follows: "Ltlhe amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the
sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) re-
ceived." Id.
"° 685 F.2d at 1162.
"' Id
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of Diedrich and the economic reality of the net gift transaction, is to adopt the
rule of Crane that gain is realized in the year of the transfer. 152
The Eighth Circuit in Diedrich relied heavily upon the Johnson case as the
rationale for its decision)" Thus, because the Supreme Court's opinion in
Diedrich approved the Eighth Circuit's reliance upon Johnson, it may reasonably
be inferred that the Supreme Court was in basic agreement with the Johnson
analysis. Johnson, although discussing both Crane and Old Colony Trust, relied
more on the former to support its holding.'" In Johnson, it will be remembered,
the taxpayer borrowed $200,000 on a nonrecourse note, pledging $500,000
worth of stock as collateral.'" He then transferred the stock to a trust, subject
to the liability, using $150,000 out of the loan proceeds to pay the gift tax, and
keeping $50,000 for himself.'" The Tax Court in Johnson, finding income to
the donor on the transaction, couched its analysis exclusively in terms of
Crane.' 57 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, while noting that with respect to
the $150,000 used to pay gift taxes the donor could be found to have realized
income under Old Colony Trust as well as Crane, seemed to focus upon the shed-
ding of the liability as the income realization event.'" In the court's view,
"each taxpayer received something of value upon transferring his encumbered
stock into trust." ' 1 "
The Crane approach, with its emphasis upon the shedding of the liability as
the realization event, finds some support in the language of the Supreme
Court's decision in Diedrich.'" The Court stated that:
1147.1hen a donee agrees to discharge an indebtedness in consideration of the gift,
the person relieved of the tax liability realizes an economic benefit. In short,
the donor realizes an immediate economic benefit by the donee's assumption of
the donor's legal obligation to pay the gift tax.'°'
Crane, therefore, ought to control for purposes of determining the year in which
income is realized. As the foregoing analysis sought to show, the cases which
' 52 See Crane, 331 U.S. at 13. It could perhaps be argued, however, that this analysis will
only apply to net gifts which occurred before October 19, 1980, the effective date of the Install-
ment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96.471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980). This Act repealed the
30% down payment requirement for installment sale treatment, as well as the requirement that
there be more than one payment. Id. at $ 2. Furthermore, the Act provided that installment sale
treatment must apply, unless the Taxpayer affirmatively elects otherwise. Id., I.R.C. 5 453(d)(1)
(Supp. V 1981). For transactions to which it applies, this may constitute a rationale for recogniz-
ing gain in the year of payment.
1 " See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. The circuit court in Diedrich stated that
"[a's we view the problem, the correct approach was taken by Johnson v. Commissioner...."
Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499, 502 (8th Cir. 1981).
' 54
 Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1083.
' 55 Id. at 1080.
' 56 Id.
'" . Johnson, 59 T.C. at 808-12.
'" Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1083.
t" Id. (emphasis supplied).
16° 457 U.S. at 197.
' 61 Id. (emphasis supplied).
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laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court's opinion in Diedrich, as well as
some language in the Diedrich opinion itself, both support this conclusion. Fur-
thermore, the arguments in favor of the Old Colony Trust approach and against
the Crane approach, as presented by the Ninth Circuit in Weeden,' 62 are not en-
tirely convincing. The argument that the donee's promise has no ascertainable
fair market value, and hence that its worth does not constitute an "amount
realized," is against the clear policy of the regulations, which state that "only
in rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair
market value. '"" In a net gift situation it appears incorrect to maintain that a
promise to pay a sum certain on a date certain in the future is not susceptible of
accurate valuation, even if in fact there exists no market for the obligation. The
argument is also unsupported by the cases the Weeden Court cited in its
favor. 164
 These cases stand only for the proposition that in the case of a contract
where the existence and amount of the consideration is "wholly contingent
upon facts and circumstances not possible to foretell with anything like fair cer-
tainty,"`" a taxpayer realizes no income before payment is actually made.'"
The second argument advanced by the Weeden court was that since the
donor remains statutorily liable for the gift tax until payment is actually made
by the donee, he therefore realizes no benefit until this payment is in fact
made. 167
 This argument appears contrary to the dictates of Treas. Reg. section
1.1001-2(a)(4)(ii) (1981). 168
 This regulation specifically includes as an amount
realized upon the disposition'" of an asset, the amount of recourse liability
secured by that asset, regardless of whether or not the transferor is in fact
released from liability.'" The policy supporting this regulation appears to be
that assumption by a buyer or donee of primary liability for a debt is sufficient
to cause the seller or donee to realize income. This conclusion finds support in
a case following the rule of Johnson. In Evangelista v. Commissioner, 17 ' it was held
that the fact that the taxpayer remained secondarily liable on a note secured by
assets he transferred to a trust did not alter the conclusion that he received an
economic benefit (and hence taxable income) from the trust's assumption of his
liability.'" Similarly, in Oates v. U.S. 173
 the taxpayer transferred certain oil
'" See supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
'" Treas. Reg.	 1.1001-1(a) (1960).
164
 Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Jones v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir. 1975); In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975); Wilhoit v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 259
(9th Cir. 1962).
'" Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931).
'" Id.
'" Weeden, 685 F.2d at 1152.
168 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
169 For purposes of the regulation in question, "disposition" includes a gift. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1001-2(a)(4)(iii) (1960).
170 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(ii) (1960).
629 F.2d 1218 (1980).
172 Id, at 1225.
173 24 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 69-5628 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
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and gas leases subject to an outstanding mortgage to various related persons.' 7 4
The District Court held that the taxpayer realized income on the transfer and
that it was immaterial that the taxpayer remained secondarily liable on the
note.'"
For the reasons discussed above, the rule of Crane should control the ques-
tion of the timing of the donor's gain in a net gift situation. Accordingly, gain
should properly be recognized in the year in which the transfer of the property
to the donee takes place. 16 This conclusion is the more logical one in view of
existing precedent. The Supreme Court's implicit recognition that the Johnson
analysis is proper also supports the inference that the Crane analogy is the cor-
rect one. The Weeden court, in holding that the donor should not recognize gain
until the donee actually pays the tax, reached an incorrect result which should
not be followed.
IV. SHOULD BASIS BE ALLOCATED IN COMPUTING DONOR'S GAIN?
The Diedrich decision held that the donor in a net gift situation realizes
capital gain income equal to the amount by which the gift tax liability arising
from the transfer exceeds his adjusted basis in the property transferred.'" The
Supreme Court recognized that the economic reality of the net gift transaction
does contain a certain element of exchange; income tax liability is thus imposed
on the donor because he has disposed of the property at least in part in a tax-
able transaction, that is, in a sale."a The remainder of the transfer is
characterized as a gift,'" and is subject to gift tax. Since the transfer of an asset
by gift in general generates no income tax consequences,' ao it must be the
disposition of part of the asset in a deemed "sale" which results in gain to the
donor. The question then becomes how much gain the donor must recognize.
Under Diedrich, the donor is deemed to have received the amount of the gift tax
paid on his behalf by the donee. The gain must therefore be the excess of this
amount realized over his basis. This conclusion, however, raises the further
question of whether the donor must allocate his basis in determining the
amount of his gain. The donor had a basis in the entire transferred asset; hence
a certain amount of this basis is potentially allocable to the "gift" portion of the
transfer, and a certain amount (the remainder) to the "sale" portion. If such
an allocation would be proper in determining the donor's gain, his gain would
be the excess of the gift taxes paid by the donee over that portion of his basis
allocated to the "sale" portion of the transfer.
1 " Id. at 69-5631.
'" Id. at 69-5632.
176 This conclusion may be qualified to the extent stated supra at note 152.
'" Diedrich, 457 U.S. at 199-200.
178 Id. at 198-99.
179 Id. at 199.
I.R.C.	 102(a) (1976).
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The Diedrich decision prima facie answers the allocation question in the
negative, stating that "[t]he gain thus derived by the donor is the amount of
the gift tax liability less the donor's adjusted basis in the entire property."' The
Court, however, does not adduce any real support for this position, except
perhaps its general statement that "[t]his treatment is consistent with 1001 of
the Internal Revenue Code."'" It shall be shown that the treatment proposed
by the Court is in fact not consistent with the Code's general rules for deter-
mination of the amount of gain or loss in the case of a taxable disposition, as set
forth in section 1001, and furthermore, that such treatment is inconsistent with
the economic reality of the net gift transaction.
In its opinion in Diedrich, the Court emphasized the "part sale and part
gift" characterization of the net gift transaction.'" Unfortunately, this con-
clusory 1 " characterization obviated any necessity for the Court to engage in an
economic analysis of the transaction, enabling it instead to justify its answer to
the basis allocation question simply by its general reference to section 1001. 185
This reference is apparently an implicit invocation of Treas. Reg. section
1.1001-1(e)(1), which states: "[W]hen a transfer of property is in part a sale
and in part a gift, the transferor has gain to the extent that the amount realized
by him exceeds his adjusted basis in the property."'"
Thus, the Court apparently was of the opinion that because the net gift
transaction contains elements of both sale and gift, Treas. Reg. section
1.1001-1(e)(1) automatically applies, and hence basis allocation is not the rule
in the net gift situation.
The problem with this approach is that it forsakes analysis in favor of the
blind application of a conclusory and facile rule. This is especially disconcert-
ing because the Court was not forced into applying this rule. There exist trans-
actions containing elements of both sale and gift, and to which, it could be
argued, the net gift transaction can more properly be analogized, which are not
treated in this way. 187 In any event, the Court in Diedrich was changing entirely
131 457 U.S. at 199.
' 82 Id. I.R.C. $ 1001 (1976) states in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Computation of gain or loss. — The gain from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis
provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the
adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount real-
ized.
(b) Amount realized. — The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received ....
Id.
"3 457 U.S. at 198.
"4 It is worthy of note that the Johnson court, to which the Supreme Court in Diedrich
owes much of its reasoning, considered the "part sale and part gift" characterization to be mere-
ly conclusory. Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1082.
183 457 U.S. at 199.
"6 Treas. Reg. 5 1.1001-1(e)(1) (1960).
1S7 See infra note 192 and accompanying Text.
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the tax treatment of net gifts, and it was certainly free to adopt any treatment of
the basis question which was rationally justifiable.
Although it is beyond the scope of this casenote to undertake an elaborate
general criticism of Treas. Reg. section 1.1001-1(e)(1), its implicit application
by the Court in this case dictates a treatment of the net gift transaction which is
consistent neither with principles of tax equity, nor with the treatment of the
transaction which an economic analysis would suggest. The casenote will now
perform such an analysis.
Leaving aside considerations of liquidity and donor preference, and focus-
ing instead solely on economic substance, it is true that every net gift transac-
tion could be restructured as a traditional gift transaction. Such a transaction,
but for income tax considerations, would be the economic equivalent of a net
gift transaction. Suppose, for example, that a donor is in the 50 percent bracket
for gift tax, and he is willing to give up property worth $900 for the benefit of
his donee. It is clear that he can structure the transfer in one of two ways. He
can transfer the entire $900 in a net gift transaction, imposing on his donee the
condition that he pay the gift tax. In this case the portion of the transfer taxable
for gift tax purposes will be $600, and the donee will pay $300 in gift tax, re-
taining the balance. Alternatively, the donor could simply transfer $600 to the
donee in a traditional gift transaction, free of any conditions, and satisfy the
gift tax liability himself out of the $300 he retained. If the only concern is the
economic substance of the transaction, as measured by the changes in net
worth of the donor and donee during the transaction, then before income taxes
are considered, both donor and donee are utterly indifferent about which form
is chosen for the transaction.
The income tax consequences of the two transactions will now be con-
sidered. Suppose that in the preceding example the donor's basis in the proper-
ty worth $900 was $180. If the donor made the transfer to the donee as a tradi-
tional gift, he would give $600 worth of property, keeping $300 worth of prop-
erty with which to pay the gift tax. When he sold the property worth $300 to
raise cash to pay the tax, he would realize capital gain income of $240, that is,
the excess of the $300 received over $60, which is his basis in that portion of the
property. 1 "B It is proper that the donor should realize this gain, because upon
the sale he is realizing the appreciation of the property he is selling. If,
however, the same transaction were structured as a net gift, the donor would
under Diedrich recognize a gain of only $120, that is, the excess of the $300 in
gift tax paid by the donee, which the donor is deemed to have received, over
$180, the donor's basis in the entire property transferred. This result obtains in
spite of the underlying economic equivalence of the two transactions. It ap-
pears to be of primary concern to Congress as a policy matter that similarly
situated taxpayers be treated alike, and hence that substantial differences in tax
liability do not hinge upon purely formal differences in the way substantially
188 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1960).
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equivalent transactions are structured.'" This principle ought to have guided
the Court in assessing the income tax consequences of the net gift form of the
transaction. The Supreme Court in Diedrich failed to apply this principle, and
as a result, the conclusion they reach is bad tax policy, in that it treats identical-
ly situated taxpayers differently. Since the application of Treas. Reg. section
1.1001-1(e)(1) to the net gift transaction would lead to such a result, such a
result is unsupportable.
The rule in a net gift situation should be that the donor recognizes gain
equal to the excess of the gift tax paid by the donee over that portion of the
donor's basis allocable to the gift tax portion of the transfer. Such a rule would,
as shown above, be more in accord with the economic substance of the transac-
tion.
This rule would also be more consistent with the Code's general treatment
of situations where one portion of a larger piece of property is disposed of by
sale. Where a portion of a larger property is sold, the general rule is that only
that portion of the taxpayer's basis in the entire property which is properly
allocable to the portion of the property which was sold may be used to offset his
gain. 190 There is case law supporting the proposition that such an allocation
must be made.'" Similarly, in the case of a bargain sale to a charitable
organization, a transaction analogous to the one at issue here in that a portion
of the property involved is transferred gratuitously, and the remainder is sold,
I.R.C. section 1011(b) specifically provides for allocation of basis.' 92 The
general theory behind this provision is that a taxpayer ought not to derive more
after-tax benefit from the previously unrealized appreciation of property by
disposing of it by gift than he could by selling it and retaining the proceeds
himself. 193
 Yet, as shown above, this is exactly what occurs in a net gift transac-
tion after Diedrich if basis allocation is not the rule. Due to this tax avoidance ef-
189 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 97-98 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 866-67; S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981),
reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 105, 108-9.
19° Treas. Reg.
	 1.61-6(a) (1960) states in pertinent part as follows:
When part of a larger property is sold, the cost or other basis of the entire property
shall be equitably apportioned among the several parts, and the gain realized or loss
sustained on the part of the entire property sold is the difference between the selling
price and the cost or other basis allocated to such part.
Id.
191 Hunter y. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 109, 115 (1965); Welsh Homes, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 279 F.2d 391, 395 (4th Cir. 1960).
192
 I.R.C. 5 1001(6) (1976) reads as follows:
(b) Bargain Sale to a Charitable Organization. If a deduction is allowable under sec-
tion 170 (relating to charitable contributions) by reason of a sale, then the adjusted
basis for determining the gain from such sale shall be that portion of the adjusted
basis which bears the same ratio to the adjusted basis as the amount realized bears to
the fair market value of the property.
Id.
193 See H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1699, 1969-3 C.B. 200, 235.
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feet which can be achieved by structuring certain donative transfers as net gifts,
arguments of tax equity support the conclusion that basis allocation is the cor-
rect result here.
This casenote has argued that in computing the amount of the donor's
gain, basis should be allocated between the sale and gift portions of the
transferred property. This result is not only desirable from the point of view of
tax policy, but more in accord with the Internal Revenue Code's general
philosophy regarding the taxation of appreciation in respect of which the tax-
payer has reaped a benefit. Nevertheless, this was not the result in Diedrich,
where the Court allowed the donor to offset against his gain his basis in the en-
tire property transferred.'" As demonstrated above, this result dictates an in-
consistent and theoretically incorrect method for . computing the donor's gain
on the transaction, and creates a tax-avoidance incentive for structuring
gratuitous transfers as net gifts. Furthermore, it would appear to ignore the
fact that there really does exist in a net gift situation some true element of gift,
which if viewed separately would not be an income taxable event at all. The en-
tire property is not being "sold," only a portion of it is. Ignoring this reality,
and treating the transaction as if the entire property transferred were being
sold, generates a result which comports with neither the intent of the parties
nor the realities of the economic exchange.
It should be noted, however, that in Diedrich the question of the amount of
the donor's gain was per se not in issue. The Supreme Court did not squarely
address the issue of basis allocation; in effect the Court simply affirmed the
Commissioner's determination as to the amount of the gain.' 95 Thus, the
Diedrich decision cannot be read as an explicit adoption by the Court of "part
sale and part gift" as the definitive substantive characterization of the transac-
tion, or of Treas. Reg. section 1.1001-1(e)(!), which was not even cited in the
decision, as the last word on the basis allocation question. Accordingly, it
would be incorrect to interpret the Diedrich decision as holding that basis alloca-
tion is not the proper rule here. Although it cannot be gainsaid that the Court
appeared to take the position that gain should not be allocated in computing
the donor's gain, it is not too late for the more plausible treatment proposed
herein to be adopted.
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONEE'S BASIS AND HOLDING PERIOD?
A. Donee's Basis
Should the donee in a net gift situation contemplate the subsequent resale
of the property so received,'" it will of course be important for him to know his
1" Diedrich, 457 U.S. at 199.
'" Since this determination was more favorable to the taxpayer than would be the result
urged by this casenote, he was naturally not disposed to dispute it.
I" The donee may, for example, contemplate resale to raise the funds necessary to
satisfy the gift tax liability.
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basis and holding period in respect of the asset to calculate properly his gain or
loss. There was no reason for the Supreme Court to raise or consider this issue
in the Diedrich decision, and it did not do so. If the Court had explicitly adopted
"part sale and part gift" as the definitive substantive characterization of the
net gift transaction, then it would have resolved this issue sub silentio. The
reason for this is that in the case of transactions which are so characterized, a
basis computation method is prescribed by Treas. Reg. section 1.1015-4(a),
which reads in pertinent part:
(a) General rule. Where a transfer of property is in part a sale and in part a
gift, the unadjusted basis of the property in the hands of the transferee is the
sum of —
(1) Whichever of the following is the greater:
(i) The amount paid by the transferee for the property, or
(ii) The transferor's adjusted basis for the property at the time of the
transfer, and
(2) The amount of increase, if any, in basis authorized by section 1015(d)
for gift tax paid.... 197
I.R.C. section 1015(d) in substance provides that in the case of property
acquired by gift, the basis of the property in the hands of the transferee is in-
creased by that portion of the gift tax paid on the transfer which is attributable
to appreciation in the property.' 98 For example, if $5 of gift tax is paid on the
transfer of property worth $10 and having a basis of $2 in the hands of the
transferor, the transferee gets an increase in basis under this section equal to $4
($8/$10 x $5).
As previously discussed, however, the Supreme Court in Diedrich stopped
short of holding that "part sale and part gift" is the definitive characterization
of the net gift transaction.' 99 As a consequence, the Diedrich decision cannot
and should not be read as absolutely prescribing all the substantive tax conse-
quences which follow from such a characterization. The result dictated by
Treas. Reg. section 1.1015-4(a) should be applied in the net gift situation only
if and to the extent that it comports with Congressional intent, as expressed in
the Code's treatment of analogous basis questions, and with the economic
reality of the transaction. It will be shown here that the application of this
197 Treas. Reg. S 1.1015-4(a) (1960).
I.R.C.	 1015(d)(6) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(A) In General. — In the case of any gifts made after December 31, 1976, the in-
crease in basis provided by this subsection with respect to any gift for the gift tax
paid under chapter 12 shall be an amount (not in excess of the amount of tax so
paid) which bears the same ratio to the amount of tax so paid as —
(i) the net appreciation in value of the gift, bears to
(ii) the amount of the gift.
(B) Net Appreciation. — For purposes of paragraph (I), the net appreciation in
value of any gift is the amount by which the fair market value of the gift exceeds the
donor's adjusted basis immediately before the gift.
Id.
' 99 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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regulation treats the question of the donee's basis in a manner which is consist-
ent with the view of the net gift transaction under which the donor does not
allocate his basis when computing the amount of gain that he is required by
Diedrich to recognize. This view does not, however, take proper account of the
economic realities of the net gift transaction, and should not be adopted.'" Ac-
cordingly, it will be argued in this section that in the computation of the
donee's basis, the result dictated by Treas. Reg. section 1.1015-4(a) should
likewise not be adopted in the net gift situation.
In general, an asset's basis is simply its cost."' A taxpayer may incur costs
in connection with an asset in a number of ways. He may make direct expen-
ditures with respect to the asset, fOr example when he purchases 4 262 or makes
improvements to it. 2 " Alternatively\he may incur an income tax liability with
respect to the asset, under circumstances which require him to include in in-
come all or part of the previously untaxed appreciation."' In such a case, the
appreciation which is taxed is added to the cost of the asset, so that the same
appreciation is not taxed again when the property is later sold."' This situation
may conveniently be thought of as simply the reverse of depreciation. Instead
of receiving a benefit, the taxpayer incurs a cost, and instead of commensurate-
ly reducing his basis, he commensurately increases it. The principle is simply
that the taxpayer should increase basis to reflect all the costs of an asset, and
should reduce it to reflect all benefits.
It is for the foregoing reasons that I.R.C. section 1015 gives a donee a
basis adjustment for gift tax paid in respect of the transfer to him of property.
Failure to do this would be in effect to disregard a significant "cost" associated
with the asset, that is, the cost of transferring it to the donee. 206
 A further ra-
tionale for allowing this adjustment is that failure to allow it would in effect
create a "tax upon a tax. " 207
 This comes about in the following manner. In a
net gift situation, the payment of the gift tax reduces the value to the donee of
the transferred property. Thus, payment of the gift tax in effect consumes some
of the appreciation in the property. Failure to allow a basis adjustment for this
gift tax creates a situation in which the donee, upon the subsequent resale of
the property, pays a tax upon the portion of the appreciation which has in effect
already been paid as gift tax, thus creating a "tax upon a tax."
Conceptually, in a net gift transfer there are three "costs" which have
been incurred with respect to an asset when it reaches the donee's hands.
200 See supra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
2°' I.R.C.	 1012 (1976).
202 Id.
203
 I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1) (1976).
204
 See e.g., I.R.C.	 1031(d) (1976).
205 Id.
2°B
	 S. REP. No, 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4791, 4859-60.
2 ° 7 See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3398. A similar rationale justifies allowing a step-up in basis for prop-
erty inherited from a decedent. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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These are (1) the donor's original cost; (2) the amount of the asset's apprecia-
tion in respect of which, pursuant to Diedrich, the donor incurred income tax
liability on the transfer; 208 and (3) the amount of the property's appreciation
which was in effect paid for gift taxes in connection with the transfer. Accord-
ingly, the donee's basis ought to reflect all and only these costs. This result, as
the following example will make clear, is only generated by Treas. Reg. section
1.1015-4(a) if one adopts the erroneous method of computing the donor's gain
suggested by the Supreme Court in Diedrich. This implies that the results
generated by Treas. Reg. section 1.1015-4(a) are themselves erroneous.
Suppose once again that a donor in the 50 percent bracket for gift tax
makes a net gift transfer of $900 worth of appreciated property having a basis of
$180, with the following results. $300 is paid in gift tax in respect of the transfer
by the donee, of which $240 is attributable to appreciation, and $60 is at-
tributable to basis. 209
 If the donor does not allocate basis in computing his gain,
then he recognizes a capital gain of $120. The donee's basis, therefore, ought
to be $540. This amount is the sum of the donor's original cost ($180), the por-
tion of the appreciation taxed to the donor as capital gain ($120), and the por-
tion of the appreciation which was paid for gift taxes ($240). This is the same
result as that which would be generated by the application of Treas. Reg. sec-
tion 1.1015-4(a). 12 a
The application of Treas. Reg. 5 1.1015-4(a), therefore, is consistent with
the donor's gain computation method implicitly recognized by the Court in
Diedrich. It does not, however, follow that its application in the net gift situation
would be correct, in view of this casenote's position that Diedrich was incorrect-
ly decided in this regard. In fact, this result implies just the reverse. It has been
argued in this casenote that the correct method for computing the donor's gain
in a net gift situation involves recognizing that both sale and gift are material
elements in the net gift transaction, and that the only treatment of the transac-
tion which is consistent with its economic reality involves dealing separately
with these two conceptually distinct elements. Allocating the donor's basis be-
tween the two parts was proposed as the only way to effect this separate treat-
ment. If this approach were adopted, the solution to the problem of the donee's
basis would follow naturally from familiar basis rules of general application,
2°8 See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 198.
2 " Under Treas. Reg. 1.1015-4(a) (1960), the donee's basis equals the greater of (i)
the amount paid by the transferee for the property (here $300), or (ii) the transferor's adjusted
basis for the property at the time of the transfer (here $180), plus the increase for gift taxes au-
thorized by section 1015(d) (here $240), for a total of $540. Id. This result always will be obtained
because the "amount paid" by the donee, the gift tax, will in all cases equal the sum of the
donor's basis and the gain recognized by him on the transaction. This is because the donor's gain
is defined under Diedrich to equal the difference between the gift tax paid and the donor's basis.
See Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 192 (1982). Note that under the preceding analysis,
the donee's basis is conceptually and in reality the same "in whole or in part" as the donor's
basis. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.1223-1(b) (1960). For the implications this has on the question of
"tacking," see infra notes 217-239 and accompanying text.
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without regard to the conceptually erroneous rule set forth in Treas. Reg. sec-
tion 1.1015-4(a).
The foregoing can be demonstrated by the following example. Suppose
once more that the donor has transferred property worth $900, and having a
basis of $180, to his donee in a net gift transaction. Suppose further that the
casenote's position regarding the computation of the donor's gain has been
adopted, and hence the donor has incurred a taxable gain of $240, rather than
$120 as under Diedrich, on the transfer. 2 " The donee, in computing his basis,
would address the "gift" and "sale" aspects of the transactions separately.
With respect to the $600 "gift" portion of the transfer, his basis would simply
be the donor's basis in that portion, here $120,212
 adjusted for gift tax paid as
provided in I.R.C. section 1015(d). Here that adjustment would be $240, giv-
ing the donee a total basis, in the assets which comprise the $600 "gift" portion
of the property, of $360. With respect to the $300 "sale" portion of the
transfer, the donee's basis would simply be the $300 he "paid" for the proper-
ty. Thus, the donee's total basis in the entire property transferred would be
$660. 2 " Note that this amount is $120 higher than the property's basis in the
donee's hands as computed under Treas. Reg. section 1.1015-4(a). This is the
correct result because, under this analysis, the donor recognizes $120 more
gain on the initial transfer than under the analysis apparently adopted by
Diedrich.'' 4
The Supreme Court in Diedrich did not explicitly adopt "part sale and part
gift" as the authoritative substantive characterization of the net gift transac-
tion. Accordingly the Court left unresolved the question of whether Treas.
Reg. section 1.1015-4(a) will control the donee's computation of his tax basis in
property received in a net gift transfer. This casenote has argued that the ap-
plication of this regulation would be consistent with a conceptually incorrect
method of computing the donor's gain, and therefore ought not to control. The
"sale" and "gift" portions of the transaction should be treated separately. On-
2 " See supra notes 177-194 and accompanying text.
212 I.R.C. 5 1015(a) (1976).
218
	
may appear at first blush as though the donee receives basis credit for the gift tax
twice. In fact, however, there is no "double credit" involved. The $300 received by the donor
which was used to pay his gift tax is included as an increase to the donee's basis because the
donor will have paid a capital gain tax on that amount of appreciation of his property, and that
portion of the property's increase in value should not again be taxed. The $240 increase in the
donee's basis which is attributable to gift taxes paid is independently proper. Its function is not to
discourage gifts. Were basis not raised by the amount of gift taxes paid, a donor would recognize
that a shift of resources to the donee would incur a tax without a corresponding adjustment in
basis for the donees. See I.R.C. SS 1015(b) (1976), 1015(d) (Supp. V 1981) and Treas. Reg.
S5 1.1015-2, -4, -5, (1960), in which Congress has authorized increases in a donee's basis both
by amounts of gain recognized upon transfers to trust and by amounts of gift taxes paid, regard-
less of the fact that such amounts may superficially appear redundant. I.R.C. SS 1015(b), (1976),
1015(d) (Supp V 1981); Treas. Reg. 1.1015-2, -4, -5 (1960).
214 .If. $120 more of appreciation is taxed in connection with the transaction, but there is
not a commensurate increase in basis, then upon a subsequent sale of the property by the donee
the same appreciation would be taxed again.
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ly if this method is adopted will the tax treatment of the net gift transaction re-
main faithful to its economic substance. 21 5
B. Donee's Holding Period
The second question which arises for the donee in a net gift situation is
whether or not he is permitted to "tack" the donor's holding period. If the
donee is permitted to "tack," then in determining whether his gain on the sale
is long-term or short-term,'" he substitutes the donor's acquisition date for his
own. There are, of course, situations in which this is quite desirable from the
donee's point of view.
The general rule is that the holder of an asset may tack where his basis is
to be computed "at least in part" by reference to the basis of the person from
whom he acquired the asset. 217 Thus, the method by which the donee computes
his basis in a net gift will affect the tacking issue. As discussed previously, it is
unclear from the Diedrich opinion whether or not the donee in a net gift situa-
tion computes his basis under Treas. Reg. section 1.1015-4(a). In this section
the casenote will first examine how the tacking question would come out if this
regulation were to control the donee's basis computation. 218 The casenote will
then examine the implications for the tacking question which would be raised
by the adoption of the basis computation method previously proposed by the
casenote. 219
It is apparent that on its face, the operation of Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a)
does not give the donee a basis determined "at least in part" by reference to
the donor's basis, and hence tacking would seem not to be permissible in a net
215 In addition, this method possesses the advantage of removing the unjustifiable in-
come tax benefit which can be derived from structuring gratuitous transfers of appreciated prop-
erty as net gifts. See supra notes 188.93 and accompanying text.
216 This determination is important because only 40% of long-term gains are includible
in the taxable income of the taxpayer, whereas 100% of short-term gains are so includible. See
I.R.C. $ 1202(a) (Supp. V. 1981).
217 Treas. Reg.	 1.1223-1(b) (1960). The regulation reads as follows:
(b) The holding period of property in the hands of a taxpayer shall include the
period during which the property was held by any other person, if such property has
the same basis in whole or in part in the hands of the taxpayer for determining gain
or loss from a sale or exchange as it would have in the hands of such other person.
For example, the period for which property acquired by gift after December 31,
1920, was held by the donor must be included in determining the period for which
the property was held by the taxpayer if, under the provisions of section 1015, such
property has, for the purposes of determining gain or loss from the sale or exchange,
the same basis in the hands of the taxpayer as it would have in the hands of the
donor.
Id.
SIB See infra notes 217-35 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
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gift situation. 22° This is the position of the Internal Revenue Service. 22 ' The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, has disagreed with the Service
on this point.
In Citizen's National Bank of Waco v. United States, 222 the settlor transferred
to trusts stock worth $714,601 and having a basis of $498,468. 223 The stock was
subject to liabilities in the amount of $500,000. 224 The settlor reported a long
term capital gain of $1,532 in connection with the transfer. 225 The issue in the
case was whether the trust, upon its subsequent sale of the stock, was entitled to
tack the senior's holding period. 226 The court held that tacking was permissi-
ble, 227 reasoning as follows. I.R.C. section 1015(a), the court noted, provides
generally that in the case of a gift, the transferee's basis shall be the same as the
donor's basis. 228 The court further noted that I.R.C. section 1015(b) provides
that in the case of a sale to a trust, the transferee's basis is the same as the
grantor's basis "increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of
loss recognized to the grantor on such transfer. . . . "229 Thus, both subsections
(a) and (b) of I.R.C. 1015 require the transferee to determine his basis at
least in part by reference to the transferor's basis. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1015-4, the
court observed, leads to the same result, although the words used therein
disguise the fact that the donor's basis is relevant to the computation. 23° The
court stated that the relevant number under Treas. Reg. 5 1.1015-4(a) is either
the transferor's basis, or the amount paid by the transferee for the property."'
Since in a net gift situation the "amount paid" is by definition equal to the
transferor's basis increased by the amount of gain recognized by the transferor,
the court noted, the regulation effects a mere change in terminology. The court
concluded that this ought not to be determinative with respect to the donee's
tacking rights."' Accordingly, the court held that to the extent Treas. Reg. sec-
tion 1.1015-4(a) would prevent a transferee who is a trustee from tacking the
settlor's holding period, the regulation is invalid."'
'" Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a) (1960). This regulation provides that the donee's basis
shall be the sum of (1) the greater of (a) the amount paid by the transferee (i.e. the gift tax) or (b)
the donor's basis, and (2) the basis adjustment provided by I.R.C., § 1015(d) (Supp. V 1981).
Id. In a net gift situation, the amount paid by the transferee will, by hypothesis, always be greater
than the donor's basis, and hence it appears that the donor's basis is never directly relevant in
computing the donee's basis.
221 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. (CCH) 7752001, 12 (1977).
222 417 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1969).
229
	
at 676.
22+ Id.
22s
226 Id.
22"
	
at 680.
228 Id. at 677 n.2.
229 I.R.C. § 1015(b) (1976).
"° 417 F.2d at 679.
711 Id.
232 Id. at 680.
239 Id.
September 1983]	 CASENOTES	 1457
The Waco decision has been criticized on the grounds that since there is no
section in the Code equivalent to I.R.C. section 1015(b) which is applicable to
individuals, the decision creates an unjustifiable distinction between in-
dividuals and trusts as transferees with respect to tacking rights. 234 This is
because Waco appears to allow tacking where a "part sale and part gift" is
made to a trust, but not when it is made to an individual.
If, however, the "part sale and part gift" label were held to be deter-
minative of all the substantive income tax consequences of the net gift transac-
tion, then an argument based on Waco could be made which would allow in-
dividuals to tack, as follows. Under such circumstances, the donee's basis in
net gift situations would be computed under Treas. Reg. 5 1.1015-4(a). If this
were the case, then the amount computed under § 1.1015-4(a)(1)(i) ("price
paid") would always be equal to the donor's basis increased by the amount of
gain recognized by the donor upon the transfer. This result would follow
automatically in every net gift situation, because the "price paid" is by defini-
tion equal to the gift tax, and the gain is measured as the difference between the
donor's basis and the gift tax. It therefore follows that the "price paid" must
always equal the donor's basis increased by the amount of gain recognized by
the donor.
As a result, if Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a) controls the donee's basis com-
putation under Diedrich, one effect of the decision would be to dictate the same
basis computation method for individuals that I.R.C. 5 1015(b) mandates for
trusts. Under such circumstances, the donee's basis in a net gift situation
would be determined in part by reference to the donor's basis, although the
wording of Treas. Reg. 5 1.1015-4 tends to disguise this fact. It could therefore
be argued, in light of Waco, that after Diedrich tacking is proper in net gift situa-
tions.
The argument is problematic, however, because it ignores Congress's ap-
parent intent in enacting the tacking provisions. Congress apparently intended
these provisions to apply in cases where the transaction by which the transferee
acquired the property was itself without tax consequences, such as a tax-free
exchange of stock pursuant to a reorganization."' After Diedrich, the net gift
transaction no longer falls into this category, and it is therefore possible to
argue that it would be contrary to Congressional intent to allow tacking in such
situations.
The entire issue can be avoided, and a more reasonable and proper treat-
ment of the tacking questions provided if, as previously suggested, the sale and
gift components of the transaction are treated separately. Treating the com-
ponents separately would result in a tax treatment both more consistent and
more in accord with the economic reality of the transaction. Under this ap-
2" See DaInman, Income Tax Consequences of Net Gifts, 59 TAxEs 275, 283-89 (1981).
235 See H.R. REP. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 315, 319;
S. REP. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 332, 346.
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proach, the donor's basis would be allocated between the "sale" and "gift"
portions of the transfer, and the donee would be able to tack the donor's
holding period for the latter but not the former. 236 This not only would con-
stitute a reasonable solution to the tacking problem, but, as shown above,
would be in accord with an overall treatment of the transaction which is at once
fairer and more consistent with the economic realities of the transaction.
Whether or not the transaction is structured as a net gift would become irrele-
vant as far as income and gift tax consequences are concerned. This is the only
supportable result, since the transaction does not differ in economic substance
depending upon its structure as a net gift or a regular gift. This equivalence
may be illustrated as follows.
Suppose as before that the donor has an appreciated asset worth $900, and
having a basis in his hands of $180, which he desires to transfer to his donee.
Suppose further that for this donor the gift tax on a taxable transfer of $600 is
$300. If the donor makes a gift of $600 worth of the property and retains $300
worth to pay the gift tax, then after the transaction the following conditions ob-
tain. The donee has property worth $600 having a basis of $360 (equaling the
donor's basis of $120 plus the gift tax adjustment of $240 provided by I.R.C.
1015(d)), 237 and is permitted to tack the donor's holding period. The donor is
out of pocket $900, and has incurred a taxable capital gain of $240.
On the other hand, if the donor transfers the entire $900, styling the trans-
action as a net gift, under Diedrich, the following results obtain if the treatment
of the transaction argued for in this casenote is not adopted. The donor would
be out of pocket $900, and he would have incurred a taxable gain of $120 in
respect of the transfer. The donee would initially receive property worth $900.
His basis in this property would be $540, if it were computed under Treas.
Reg. § 1.1015-4(a). 238 When he sold $300 worth of property to raise cash to pay
the gift tax, he would recognize $120 of capital gain. It is unclear whether or
not he would be permitted to tack the donor's holding period. Note that the ef-
fect of Diedrich is to allow a substantial portion of the donor's gift tax liability to
be discharged out of appreciation which is taxed to the donee.
Different and conceptually more correct results would obtain, however, if,
in the case of a transaction styled as a net gift, its gift and sale portions were
treated separately. The donor would, as before, be out of pocket $900, but he
would have incurred a taxable capital gain of $240 in respect of the "sale" por-
tion of the transaction. The donee would initially receive $900. His basis in the
$600 "gift" portion would be $120, subject to a section 1015(d) adjustment of
$240 upon his payment of the gift tax. For purposes of any subsequent resale,
he would be permitted to tack the donor's holding period. His basis in the $300
"sale" portion would be its cost, $300. Thus his sale of this portion to raise
236 At one time, the Service itself took this position. See I.T. 2681, XII-1 C.B. 93 (1933).
"' See supra note 198.
" 8 See supra note 210.
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funds to pay the gift tax would not generate any taxable gain to him, which is
the correct result since the donor would have already been taxed on this ap-
preciation. 239
In summary, the Diedrich decision raises the question of whether the donee
in a net gift situation will be permitted to tack the donor's holding period in
determining whether his gain on a subsequent resale of the property is long-
term or short-term. If the "part sale and part gift" characterization of the
transaction is adopted, then the tacking issue will remain unresolved, pending
more explicit adjudication. This uncertainty can be obviated by explicitly re-
jecting this characterization as conclusory and misleading, and instead analyz-
ing the net gift as effectively two separate transactions. The result of such
analysis is to treat alike the net giver and the traditional giver who engage in
economically equivalent transactions.
CONCLUSION
Many issues arise in connection with a net gift transaction. In Diedrich v.
Commissioner, the Supreme Court squarely addressed only one of them. In its
narrow holding that the donor in a net gift situation realized taxable gain, the
Court is surely correct. The Diedrich opinion, however, has given ambiguous
indications concerning the other issues raised by the net gift transaction. These
issues include the timing and amount of the donor's gain, and the amount of
the donee's basis and the length of his holding period. The issue of the timing
of the donor's gain should be resolved by adopting the approach of Crane,
which requires that the assumption of liability by the donee be considered the
realization event. Thus, the donor should realize gain in the year in which he
makes the net gift transfer. The remaining issues should not be resolved by
resort to the conclusory and facile "part sale and part gift" characterization.
Instead, a treatment of the transaction which respects its economic substance
should be adopted. Thus, the transaction should be viewed as having separate
and distinguishable "sale" and "gift" elements. In this manner, the donor's
basis can be allocated between these two elements in computing the amount of
his gain. The result of this allocation is to tax the donor on the gain from which,
as an economic matter, he has actually benefitted. Such an allocation also
resolves the question of the proper method for the donee to employ in com-
puting his basis in the transferred property, by allowing him to apply well-
settled basis rules to the "sale" and "gift" portions of the transferred property
separately. In like manner, this allocation resolves the tacking problem, since a
separate treatment of the "sale" and "gift" portions obviates the need to inter-
pret the ambiguous and confusing Treas. Reg. section 1.1015-4(a).
"9 Tacking would not be permitted with respect to the "sale" portion, under Treas.
Reg. % 1.1223-1(b) (1960). Of course, this is irrelevant if the "sale" portion is immediately resold
to pay gift tax, because no gain would be realized.
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The treatment proposed by this casenote provides solutions to the prob-
lems treated herein which are consistent with one another, as well as being
faithful to the economic realities of the net gift transaction. It is therefore urged
that its adoption be considered by any courts interpreting Diedrich.
JOEL R. CARPENTER
